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Abstract: In this paper we revisit the long debate on the risk effects of bank competition and 
propose a new approach to the empirical estimation of the relation between deposit market 
competition and bank risk. Our approach accounts for the opportunity of banks to shift to 
wholesale funding when deposit market competition is intense. The analysis is based on a 
unique comprehensive dataset which combines retail deposit rates data with data on bank 
characteristics and with data on local deposit market features for a sample of 589 U.S. banks. 
Our results support the notion of a risk-enhancing effect of deposit market competition. 
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1.  Introduction 
Profound  changes  in  the  structure  of  U.S.  and  European  banking  markets  and  repeated 
instances of financial system distress have propelled interest in the relationship between bank 
competition and bank risk. However, after more than two decades of extensive research on the 
issue, the literature is still missing a definite answer on whether intense deposit or loan market 
competition is positively related to bank risk.  
In this paper we examine the impact of deposit market competition on bank risk empirically. 
For this purpose we propose a new analytical framework that accounts for the substitutability 
of  retail  deposits  and  wholesale  funds  and  uses  the  costs  of  wholesale  funding  as  an 
identifying tool in the analysis of the nexus between deposit market competition and risk. The 
intuition behind our approach is the following: when the deposit market competition faced by 
a bank intensifies, the cost of retail funding relative to wholesale liabilities rises, and the 
bank’s demand for wholesale funding (federal funds, subordinated debt, etc.) shifts upwards
1. 
As a result, the cost and the volume of wholesale funding are correlated with the intensity of 
retail deposit market competition faced by the bank.  
Moreover, the cost and volume of wholesale funding are also related to bank risk. This is the 
case because, as the literature on market discipline shows, the supply of wholesale funding 
available to a bank depends on the risk of the bank, since uninsured wholesale lenders are 
likely  to  either  ration  funds  to  high-risk  banks  or  charge  riskier  banks  higher  interest  on 
wholesale funding (Flannery and Sorescu, 1996; DeYoung et al., 1998; Morgan and Stiroh, 
2001; Furfine, 2001; King, 2007; Ashcraft, 2008; Dinger and von Hagen, 2009). The volume 
and the cost of the wholesale liabilities observed on a bank’s balance sheet, therefore, depend 
                                                 
1 Pennacchi (1988) models the effect of retail deposit market competition on banks’ retail funding costs and 
banks’  incentives  to  sell/buy  loans.  Here  we  extend  the  argument  to  the  choice  of  optimal  (retail  versus 
wholesale) liability structure. 
   3
on both the risk of the bank and the intensity of retail deposit market competition it faces. We 
account  for  these  interrelations  between  bank  risk  and  the  costs  of  retail  and  wholesale 
funding by estimating a joint empirical model of the impact of those costs on bank risk.  
Understanding how bank competition—and retail deposit market competition, in particular 
interacts with bank risk is essential for the formulation of appropriate regulatory policies. 
Given the applicability to policy, it is not surprising that a wide body of research has focused 
on examining, theoretically and empirically, the potential trade-off between competition and 
stability. However, both theoretical and empirical results are still mixed. The indefinite state 
of the debate motivates us to revisit the question. 
Earlier  theoretical  contributions  (e.g.,  Dermine,  1986)  show  that  market  power  increases 
banks’ incentives to invest in safer projects. In a seminal paper, Keeley (1990) shows that 
deregulation  of  the  U.S.  banking  market  led  to  more  intense  competition  between  banks, 
which then caused banks to pursue riskier strategies. Following another line of argument, 
Broecker (1990) also shows that the average quality of banks’ asset portfolios is negatively 
correlated with the number of loan market competitors, because a rise in the number of banks 
increases the probability of “lemon” borrowers to be granted a loan. In a related argument, 
Dell Ariccia and Marquez (2005) show that the share of “unknown” borrowers determines the 
incentives  of  the  banks  to  invest  in  screening  costs  and  thus  increases  the  probability  of 
lending booms and banking crises.  
Focusing on deposit market competition, Allen and Gale (2000) show that if banks choose a 
parameter  that  determines  the  default  risk  of  their  assets,  the  optimal  risk  of  failure  is 
increasing  with  the  number  of  deposit  market  competitors.  Based  on  a  similar  line  of 
argument,  Hellmann  et  al.  (2000)  and  Repullo  (2004)  also  theoretically  show  a  positive 
relation between bank risk and competition. Shy and Stenbacka (2004), however, argue that 
this result only holds because deposit insurance makes depositors insensitive to bank risk. If   4
in  the  absence  of  deposit  insurance,  banks  compete  in  both  the  risk  and  the  deposit  rate 
dimensions,  in  the  presence  of  deposit  insurance  they  only  compete  in  the  deposit  rate 
dimension. Boyd and de Nicolo (2005) also challenge Allen and Gale’s (2000) approach. 
These  authors  argue  that  if  Allen  and  Gale’s  assumption  that  asset  portfolios  and  return 
distributions are given is dropped, banks would face an optimal contracting problem in which 
the actions of borrowers are unobservable. In this case, the number of competitors may reduce 
the risk of bank failure. The intuition behind this result is that if loan market competition is 
less  intense,  banks  will  set  high  loan  rates,  which  will  drive  borrowers  to  choose  riskier 
projects.  
Empirical research on the topic has so far also produced mixed results. Demsetz et al. (1996), 
Brewer and Seidenberg (1996), Saunders and Wilson (1996), Salas and Saurina (2003) and 
Jimenez et al. (2007) document a positive link between the intensity of bank competition and 
bank risk,  whereas  Boyd et  al. (2006), de Nicolo and  Loukianova  (2007), Schaeck  et  al. 
(2008) and Schaeck and Cihak (2008), show the existence of a negative relationship
2.  
The empirical research on the relation between bank competition and risk faces numerous 
challenges  such  as  disentangling  deposit  from  loan  market  competition  (which  theory 
suggests can generate opposite risk effects), finding appropriate proxies for competition, and 
handling the endogeneity of a bank’s deposit market competitive position with respect to its 
risk.  
Our approach addresses these challenges directly. First, whereas most of the existing literature 
measures competition by broad concentration ratios, which cannot disentangle deposit and 
loan  market  competition,  we  explicitly  focus  on  deposit  market  competition.  Second,  we 
concentrate on the intensity of the deposit market competition faced by each individual bank 
                                                 
2 Berger et al. (2008) focus on the robustness of alternative models of bank competition and risk. They find that 
results are sensitive to changes in the risk measure (loan portfolio versus overall risk) and to the choice of the 
competition measure.    5
and use the deposit rates paid by a bank in a given local market as a proxy for the intensity of 
the deposit market competition faced by the bank in that particular local market
3. By using 
retail deposit rates offered by the bank as a proxy for the intensity of the deposit market 
competition it faces, we allow banks operating in the same local market to face different 
intensities of competition, for example, because of comparative advantages in serving some 
depositor groups. Third, we recognize that a bank’s competitive position in the deposit market 
is not exogenous with respect to bank risk,
4 and we employ the substitutability between retail 
and wholesale funding as an identification tool. Our identification strategy was motivated by 
experiences from the recent financial crisis, when the failure of major investment and money 
center banks with little or no access to retail funding shed new light on the relation between 
the access to retail deposits and bank risk. Consequently, we can now relate the question of 
the  risk  effects  of  deposit  market  competition  to  the  extensive  use  of  wholesale  funding 
(Tirole, 2009; Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009).  
Our  main  contribution  consists  in  identifying  a  joint  system  of  the  costs  of  retail  and 
wholesale bank funding and bank risk. This approach extends the scope of bank competition 
and risk analysis by including wholesale funding
5. There are two direct advantages associated 
with this approach. First, we are not exclusively focused on retail deposits, which by the end 
                                                 
3 We are aware of only three other empirical studies which employ bank-level competition measures. Schaeck 
and Cihak (2008) use the Boone indicator (Boone, 2008) as a competition measure. This indicator does not 
distinguish between deposit and loan market power of the bank. Jimenez et al. (2007) measure deposit and loan 
market competition separately by the deposit and the loan market Lerner index of the bank, respectively. They, 
however, have only aggregate retail rate data for each of the sample banks and no information about the rates in 
the different local markets. Berger et al. (2008) employ a bank-level overall Lerner index reflecting output and 
input prices in both the deposit and loan market. 
4  See  Shy  and  Stenbacka  (2004)  for  a  model  of  the  endogeneity  of  deposit  market  competition  and  risk. 
Obviously, as these authors note, deposit insurance schemes reduce the impact of bank risk on the competitive 
position of the bank relative to deposit markets. Nevertheless, as numerous examples from the recent crisis 
showed, depositors care about the risk of the bank. 
5 To our knowledge the only study that relates wholesale funding, competition, and risk is Goyal (2005). In his 
empirical framework Goyal (2005) assumes that high bank competition is reflected in low bank charter value 
and high bank risk, and he examines the effect of the charter value on the yield and the inclusion of covenants on 
bank subordinated debt. He finds that low charter values correspond to more covenants in the subordinated debt 
contract and higher subordinated debt yields.   6
of  our  sample  period  represent  only  about  50%  of  total  bank  liabilities
6.  We  are  rather 
including a wider set of liabilities in the analysis. Second, since wholesale funding is related 
to  both  retail  deposit  market  competition  and  risk,  its  explicit  inclusion  in  the  analysis 
strengthens identification and avoids a potential omitted variable bias.  
Our empirical analysis is based on a rich dataset of deposit rates offered by 581 U.S. banks in 
164 metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs), combined with balance sheet data of the banks as 
well as market structure characteristics of the MSAs. The time period encompasses 1997 to 
2006. The richness of the data allows us to employ variation across local deposit markets, 
across banks, and across time in the analysis. 
The  results  of  our  empirical  analysis  point  to  a  robust,  positive,  and  statistically  and 
economically significant relation between the retail deposit rates offered by a bank and its 
asset portfolio and default risk. These results are consistent with the economic insight that 
banks with cheap retail sources of funding pursue more conservative risk strategies (Allen and 
Gale, 2000; Hellmann et al., 2000, etc). They should not, however, be interpreted as a direct 
support for limiting bank market competition. The reason being that we compare levels of 
bank assets’ portfolio risk but do not empirically determine the threshold whereupon the risk 
of individual banks should be considered excessive, which would establish a direct link to 
financial system stability. Also, since we do not present any welfare analysis, we are unable to 
address the trade-off between the lack of efficiency resulting from imperfect bank competition 
and  the  potential  fragility  of  competitive  banks.  Our  results  can,  however,  be  used  by 
regulators to focus regulatory and supervisory attention on banks with a limited access to 
retail deposits.  
                                                 
6 Data from the “Flow of Funds Accounts” by the Federal Reserve Board suggest that retail deposits represent 
less than 58% of total bank liabilities in 2002; by 2007 the share of retail deposits has fallen below 52%.   7
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the data. Section 3 presents 
the empirical methodology. Section 4 discusses the results of our empirical study. Section 5 
discusses some robustness checks, and Section 6 concludes. 
2.  Data 
This empirical study is based on a comprehensive dataset combining three main data sources. 
First, we employ the financial statements (balance sheets and income statements) reported by 
589 U.S. banks in the Quarterly Reports of Conditions and Income (Call Reports). We then 
match the Call Report data with BankRate Monitor data on the retail deposit rates offered by 
each  of  these  banks  in  each  of  164  metropolitan  statistical  areas  covered  by  BankRate 
Monitor
7(if the respective bank has a branch in the MSA). BankRate Monitor deposit rate data 
have weekly frequency. To match the quarterly frequency of the Call Reports, we use only the 
deposit rates reported on the last week of each quarter. Third, we match our bank-market 
observations  with  characteristics  of  the  local  bank  market  (the  MSA)  drawn  from  the 
Summary of Deposits
8. The data encompass a period starting on September 19, 1997, and 
ending on July 21, 2006.  
After merging our data, we have a multidimensional (unbalanced) panel dataset consisting of 
bank-level data (risk variables, bank size, capitalization), market-level data (HHI, market size, 
average income of the MSA’s population, income growth, etc.), and bank-market-level data 
(retail deposit rates, share of the MSA’s branches, branches per deposit volume in the market, 
etc.). It is often assumed in the banking literature that multimarket banks charge uniform rates 
across local markets (e.g. Radecki, 1998; Park and Pennacchi, 2008). A closer look at our 
sample, however, uncovers a high degree of cross-market variation in multimarket banks’ 
pricing. The data presented in Table 1 illustrate that the variation in the deposit rates set by a 
                                                 
7The coverage of BankRate Monitor limits our sample to 589 banks. 
8 Summary of Deposits data have annual frequency (as of end of June). We attach the same values of the local 
market variables to all four corresponding quarters.   8
multimarket bank in the different MSAs is equal to about one-third of the variation of all 
deposit rates offered by all banks in a MSA. We explore this cross-market variation in the 
pricing of multimarket banks as a proxy for local market competitive conditions. 
Table 1: Cross-market and cross-bank variation in checking account rates 
 
Note: Variation within the market is computed by first computing by local market the variation (standard deviation or mean 
absolute deviation from the mean) of the checking account rates offered by all banks. Then the variation is averaged across 
local  markets.  Variation  within  the  bank  is  computed  by  first  computing  by  multimarket  bank  the  variation  (standard 
deviation or mean absolute deviation from the mean) of the checking account rates offered in the various local markets. Then 
the variation is averaged across all multimarket banks. 
3.  Methodology 
In this section we present an empirical model of the impact of bank retail deposit market 
competition on bank risk, which integrates the simultaneity of a bank’s competitive position 
with respect to deposit markets, the cost [?] of wholesale funding, and bank risk. We measure 
a bank’s deposit market competitive position in a given local market by the retail deposit rates 
offered by the bank in this market. Our empirical model then translates into a model on the 
relation  between  retail  and  wholesale  rates  and  bank  risk.  It  starts  with  a  main  equation 
describing the impact of deposit and wholesale rates on bank risk. This equation models our 
main hypothesis that the risk of the bank depends on the costs of its retail and wholesale 
liabilities (Allen and Gale, 2000, Hellmann et al., 2000, Repullo, 2004):  







deviation from the 




1998 0.25 0.18 0.07 0.03
1999 0.33 0.24 0.15 0.07
2000 0.33 0.24 0.13 0.08
2001 0.49 0.37 0.21 0.14
2002 0.60 0.43 0.17 0.14
2003 0.56 0.40 0.16 0.12
2004 0.80 0.53 0.27 0.13
2005 0.71 0.50 0.29 0.14
2005 1.05 0.70 0.20 0.15
2006 0.96 0.65 0.17 0.13
variation within the market  9
where r denotes the risk of the bank, d the retail deposit rates, and w the interest rate on 
wholesale liabilities
9. The subscripts i, j, and t refer to the bank, the local market (MSA), and 
the time period, respectively.   
Accounting  for  the  simultaneity  of  bank  risk  and  banks’  retail  and  wholesale  rates,  we 
explicitly model the reverse causality by the following equations and identify the model using 
a zero restriction identification strategy
10: 
) , , ( , , , , controls w r f d t i t i t j i =         (2) 
) , ( , , controls r f w t i t i =          (3) 
Equation (2) models the dependence of retail deposit rates on bank risk and the costs of 
wholesale funding
11. The dependence of deposit rates on bank risk is based on the assumption 
of some risk sensitivity of insured deposits, or in other words, that bank risk is a determinant 
of  its  deposit  market  competitive  position.  The  risk  of  the  bank  can  also  affect  its  retail 
deposit rates through a “wholesale” channel: as shown by Billet et al. (1998), riskier banks 
shift from uninsured wholesale funds to insured retail liabilities. Such a shift requires higher 
retail rates to attract sufficient retail deposits.  
The dependence of deposit rates on wholesale rates has already been shown in theoretical 
work. Kiser (2003) and Park and Pennacchi (2008) model loans as the output in a production 
function that uses retail and wholesale funds as inputs. The assumption is then made that, 
whereas banks can have market power in the retail deposit market, they are price takers in the 
                                                 
9 Equation (1) explicitly accounts only for the variable costs of retail and wholesale funds.  We include a number 
of control and instrument variables to account for the variation in the fixed costs of deposits and wholesale 
funds. 
10 One of the reasons we prefer a static to a dynamic identification scheme (e.g., one based on lags of the 
dependent variable) is the rigidity of bank retail deposit rates, which implies that we might observe the same 
retail rate in two consecutive quarters.  
11 Jimenez et al. (2007) is the only other study we are aware of that uses prices as a measure of the intensity of 
competition. The authors explore the relation between competition and risk in the Spanish banking sector. They 
fail to recognize, however,  the simultaneity of prices and proceed with a reduced-form model.   10
wholesale market. In this framework, Kiser finds that an exogenous rise in the wholesale rate 
is related to an increase in the optimum retail deposit rate offered by the bank. Following the 
same line of argument, Park and Pennacchi (2008) assume that only large multimarket banks 
can borrow wholesale funds at an exogenously given wholesale rate. This access to wholesale 
funding makes large banks less aggressive when competing for retail funds. In both models 
the availability and the cost of wholesale liabilities determine retail deposit rates
12. In our 
approach we approximate the availability and the costs of wholesale funds by the interest rate 
on wholesale liabilities paid by the bank
13. 
Equation (3) describes the risk sensitivity of the wholesale funding rate
14. Wholesale rates are 
assumed  to  be  risk-sensitive  because  wholesale  creditors  adjust  the  interest  rate  to  the 
probability of the borrower’s failure since wholesale liabilities are not covered by deposit 
insurance. Furfine (2001), for example, proves that riskier banks pay higher rates on federal 
funds.  Moreover,  Flannery  and  Sorescu  (1996),  DeYoung  et  al.  (1998),  and  Morgan  and 
Stiroh (2001) find that riskier banks pay higher interest on subordinated debt
15. Following 
Pennacchi  (1988), we also allow wholesale rates to depend on retail  rates, assuming that 
banks facing intense deposit market competition show a higher demand for wholesale funds. 
In this equation we also control for the impact of retail deposit rates on a bank’s demand for 
wholesale funds. 
                                                 
12  An  alternative  approach  of  modeling  the  relationship  between  retail  and  wholesale  deposits  is  taken  by 
Jimenez et al (2007). These authors concentrate solely on the difference between wholesale and retail rates 
(deposit market Lerner index) as a measure of deposit market power and do not explicitly model the interaction 
between wholesale and retail rates. 
13 In the subsection on the estimation technique (3.4) we discuss the effects and treatment of the sample selection 
issue related to the rates on wholesale liabilities. 
14 Here we deviate from the simple Lerner indices approach presented by Jimenez et al (2007) which implicitly 
assumes that all banks, independent of their risk levels, face the same country-wide money market rates. 
15 To our knowledge the only study that relates wholesale funding, competition, and risk is Goyal (2005). In his 
empirical framework Goyal assumes that high bank competition is reflected in low bank charter value and high 
bank risk, and examines the effect of the charter value on the yield and the inclusion of covenants on bank 
subordinated debt. He finds that low charter values correspond to more covenants in the subordinated debt 
contract and higher subordinated debt yields.   11
3.1.Measures of bank risk, deposit rates, and wholesale rates 
We employ two alternative measures of bank risk in the estimations: the z-score and the non-
performing loans ratio
16. Following Boyd et al. (2006), we compute the z-score as the ratio of 
the sum of a bank’s average return on assets (ROA) and capitalization (E/A = equity/total 










= - .        (4) 
The z-score, therefore, presents information on how many standard deviations of the return on 
assets are needed to drive the bank into default and is a broader measure of risk than the 
nonperforming loans ratio, which is exclusively focused on loan risk. Banks with a low z-
score are more likely to default. That is, the z-score is decreasing with bank risk. To facilitate 
the interpretation of the results and the comparison with the alternative risk measures, we use 
the negative z-score as a risk proxy in the regressions. 
Our  alternative  risk  measure,  the  nonperforming  loans  ratio,  is  computed  as  the  ratio  of 
impaired loans to total outstanding loans. In the baseline specifications of the regressions we 
use the log of the ratio with a four-quarter lead
18. The intuition is that the risk of the current 
projects will only be reflected with a delay in the nonperforming loan ratios of the bank
19.  
                                                 
16 Boyd et al. (2006) and Schaeck and Cihak (2008) measure bank risk by the z-score. They find that bank 
competition (measured by the Herfindahl index or the concentration of the banking industry in Boyd et al, 2006 
and the Boone indicator in Schaeck and Cihak, 2008) has a negative impact on risk. On the other hand, Jimenez 
et al. (2007) concentrate on the risk of the loan portfolio measured by the ratio of nonperforming loans to total 
loans.  They  find  that  deposit  market  competition  has  no  significant  impact  on  asset  risk,  but  loan  market 
competition is positively related to the risk of a bank’s asset portfolio.  
 
17 The means and the standard deviation are computed by using rolling windows of 8 quarters. 
18  Regression  specifications  using  the  current  (as  in  Jimenez  et  al.,  2007)  and  the  two-quarter-lead  of  the 
nonperforming loan ratios result in qualitatively the same results. 
19 As a robustness check we have rerun the model using the ratio of nonperforming loans to equity as a risk 
measure (again with a four-quarter lead). According to Ashcraft (2007), this is a better measure of bank risk 
since the capitalization of the bank affects the amount of nonperforming loans a bank can absorb before harming   12
Turning to bank retail deposit rates as a proxy for deposit market competitive position, we 
choose checking account rates as the most suitable for our exercise
20. This choice is motivated 
by  the  fact  that  previous  research  has  documented  that  checking  account  rates  are  more 
sensitive to changes in the local bank market structure than money market deposit account 
rates
21 and certificates of deposit (Hannan and Prager, 1998, Craig and Dinger, 2009). Since 
we observe bank retail rates in different local markets (MSAs) we control for the intensity of 
local deposit market competition and identify the deposit rate equation using the variation of 
local market characteristics across the MSAs.  
And finally, in our baseline specification, we use the interest rate on federal funds purchased 
as a proxy for the costs of wholesale funding. Purchased federal funds are liabilities with a 
very short maturity and thus are not perfect substitutes for retail deposits. The rate a bank pays 
on federal funds is, however, shown to be closely correlated with alternative bank wholesale 
liabilities (such as subordinated debt, advances from Federal Home Loan Banks, and others), 
which are potentially better substitutes for retail deposits from a bank’s point of view. The 
advantage of federal funds over these alternative wholesale liabilities for our framework is 
that we have fed funds observations for most banks in our sample
22. Moreover, comparison 
across banks is further facilitated by the fact that the fed funds market has a standardized 
“product”
23.  We follow King (2008) and approximate the interest rate on fed funds purchased 
                                                                                                                                                         
its creditors. The results of the estimation are very similar to those using nonperforming loans to total loans as a 
dependent variable. 
20 Bankrate Monitor reports the rates on a variety of retail deposit products, such as checking accounts, money 
market deposit accounts, and certificates of deposits, with a maturity of three months to up to five years. 
21 We have rerun all regression specifications using the money market deposit account rates as a retail deposit 
rate measure. The results are qualitatively the same as when the checking account rate is employed, although 
statistical significance is sometimes lower. Results are available from the authors upon request. 
22 In order to account for the noise introduced in the fed funds rate data when the volume of fed funds liabilities 
is  negligibly  small,  we  introduce  a  screen  based  on  the  share  of  fed  funds  liabilities  in  total  assets  in  the 
estimation  of  equation  (3)  and    account  for  the  potential  selection  bias  by  using  a  Heckman  correction 
(Heckman, 1976).  
23 Alternative wholesale funding products bear a substantial nonprice component such as covenants (see Goyal, 
2005), which should be accounted for, for a precise comparison. Data about these are, however, unavailable for 
the broad range of banks included in our study.    13
by the ratio of “expense of federal funds purchased and securities sold under agreements to 
repurchase” (line riad4180  in the Call Report) to “federal funds purchased and securities sold 
under  agreements  to  repurchase”  (line  rcfd3353  in  the  Call  Report)
24.  In  the  robustness 
section we alternatively estimate the model using the subordinated debt rate as a wholesale 
rate proxy. 
Table 2 illustrates descriptive statistics of the variables included in our estimations. It shows 
substantial variation of the checking account rate, between 0 and 3.8%. Some of that variation 
is due to the time series dimension of our data, which span a period from 1997 to 2006 and 
cover a full interest rate cycle. Our risk measures also exhibit substantial variation: the z-score 
varies between 2 and 492, and the nonperforming loan ratios vary between zero and more 
than 12%. 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
 
 
Note: The ”raw” rates on wholesale liabilities before applying the screen of federal funds purchase > 1% of total assets and 
outstanding subordinated debt >1% of total assets are reposted in the table. 
3.2.Identification and Instruments 
Our identification follows a “zero restriction” strategy. Each of the endogenous variables is 
instrumented by a suitable set of instrumental variables, which are uncorrelated with the error 
term but strongly correlated with the instrumented endogenous variable.  
                                                 
24 As King (2008) notes, this approximation includes the cost of securities sold under agreements to repurchase, 
which are a collateralized liability of the bank and might be less sensitive to bank risk. The fact that a substantial 






checking account rate (in %) 18715 0.538 0.539 0.000 3.800
T-Bill three month (in %) 18715 3.361 1.769 0.880 6.210
effective fed funds rate (in %) 18715 3.535 1.949 0.938 7.125
rate on subordinated debt (in %) 13279 0.025 0.181 0.000 7.793
rate on federal funds purchased (in %) 17439 0.026 -0.823 0.002 100.335
Z-score 9679 78.820 94.260 2.575 492.196
NPL (in %) 12098 0.004 0.004 0.000 0.122
number of branches  per 1000000 USD deposits 16039 0.022 0.022 0.000 1.050
herfindahl index 17879 0.159 0.066 0.051 0.770
BHCdummy  18715 0.947 0.225 0.000 1.000
average income in the MSAs  (in thous. USD) 15581 32.257 16.367 5.672 375.689
average income growth in the MSAs 15581 0.050 0.024 -0.054 0.158  14
In the case of retail deposit rates, we base our identification strategy on the assumption that 
banks control for local deposit market competition when setting their deposit rates
25. Here we 
borrow  from  the  literature,  which  has  found  that  the  ratio  of  branches  to  deposits,  the 
Herfindahl index of the local deposit market, and the market size are significant determinants 
of a bank’s retail deposit rates (see Prager and Hannan, 2004). We argue that these variables 
are only  right-hand variables for the deposit rate equation, not the wholesale rate or  risk 
equations,  and  thus  employ  these  variables  as  instruments  for  the  retail  deposit  rate.  The 
branches-to-deposits ratio is computed at the bank-market level as the ratio of the number of 
bank i’s branches in local market j to bank i’s total deposits (in millions of USD) in this 
market. The underlying assumptions when using these variables as deposit rate instruments is 
that banks with more branches can attract deposits at lower rates (because they have better 
geographical proximity to retail customers). The Herfindahl index is the sum of squares of the 
deposit market shares of all banks operating in the MSA (this variable is drawn from the 
FDIC Summary of Deposits). This variable controls for the concentration of market power. 
The market size variable is the log of the population of the respective market.  
The  instrumentation  of  the  wholesale  rate  in  the  deposit  and  risk  equations  focuses  on 
variables which affect the rate a bank pays on wholesale liabilities but which do not have an 
impact on deposit rates and bank risk. Our major instrument for the rate on wholesale fund is 
the average effective level of the federal funds rate (as announced by the Federal Reserve 
Bank  of  New  York,  based  on  its  survey  of  four  major  brokers).  The  inclusion  of  this 
instrument  follows  the  argument  that  the  rate  banks  pay  on  wholesale  liabilities  reflects 
changes in the average rate on fed funds
26. We also use a dummy variable, which takes the 
                                                 
25 Note that we observe substantial cross-market variation in retail rates within the multimarket banks (which we 
will discuss in our data section) in our sample, which can be employed in the identification.  
26 Note that by including this instrument in the regressions we also control for the general interest rate level, so 
that variation in the checking account rate is then only related to cross-market and cross-bank variation and not 
to the general interest rate cycle. A change in the effective fed funds rate is probably also related to the amount   15
value  of  one  if  the  bank  belongs  to  a  bank  holding  company  and  zero  otherwise  (BHC 
dummy),  as  an  additional  instrument  for  the  wholesale  rate.  The  intuition  behind  this 
instrument is that wholesale funding is cheaper for banks that are members of large bank 
holding companies (BHCs), but risk choice and the deposit rate do not necessarily depend on 
BHC  membership.  Both  the  average  fed  funds  rate  and  the  BHC  dummy  are  weak 
instruments. The average fed funds rate shows no variation across banks, while the BHC 
dummy shows almost no variation across time. To strengthen identification, we also include a 
dummy variable taking the value of one if the bank is a member of the Federal Home Loan 
Bank, and zero otherwise (FHLB dummy), as an additional instrument for the wholesale rate. 
The inclusion of this instrument follows King (2008) and Ashcraft, Bech and Frame (2008). 
These authors argue that advances from the Federal Home Loan Bank system are empirically 
relevant substitutes for other forms of wholesale borrowing. Their availability can, therefore, 
shift a bank’s demand for federal funds. 
The risk of a bank  can be instrumented by  the average  economic conditions in the local 
markets where a bank operates. Cross-country evidence suggests that bank default risk (Boyd 
and de Nicolo, 2006) and nonperforming loans (Dinger and von Hagen, 2009) are negatively 
related to average income and economic growth. For the United States, Mian and Sufi (2008) 
demonstrate for the case of mortgage lending a negative relation between default rates and 
MSA  average  income.  Moreover,  theoretical  and  empirical  research  shows  that  lending 
standards depend on local economic growth (see Ruckle, 2004, for a discussion). General 
economic conditions are effective instruments because, although they significantly affect the 
risk of the banks operating in the local market, they do not have a direct impact on wholesale 
and deposit rates. Following this line of argument, we instrument the risk of a bank by the 
                                                                                                                                                         
of risk taken on by the bank (see Jimenez et al., 2008), as well as the deposit rate it can charge, but we assume 
that  this  impact  goes  through  the  costs  of  wholesale  funding  faced  by  the  bank.  Since  our  system  is 
overidentified, we also have tried including this variable in the deposit rate and the risk equation with little 
change in the results.  
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average household income in the markets where a bank operates (income) and the annual 
household  income  growth  averaged  across  the  markets  where  a  bank  operates  (income 
growth)
27.   
In the case of all instruments, the Stock-and-Watson-rule-of-thumb measure
28 confirms the 
strength of the instrument, and, in the case of multiple instruments, a Hansen test does not 
reject exogeneity of the instruments. 
3.3.Control variables 
As suggested by earlier research, a few variables such as capitalization and bank size can 
affect all three dependent variables (Hannan and Hanwick, 1998, Furfine, 2001, Boyd et al., 
2006). That is why, we include as control variables in all three equations the ratio of bank 
equity to total assets as a measure of capitalization, and the log of the bank’s total assets as a 
proxy for bank size, as well as the squared bank size variable (to control for nonlinearities in 
the relation between bank size and bank risk and retail and wholesale rates).  
A bank’s competitive position in the loan market can also affect its risk and the costs of retail 
and wholesale funding. To this end, we include the ratio of loans in the balance sheet plus the 
volume of securitized loans to the total assets of the bank (loans to total assets) as a control 
for the bank’s market power in the loan market
29. The idea is that if a bank has substantial 
market power in the loan market, it will have a higher share of loans (which on average 
                                                 
27 Average FICO scores can alternatively be used as a risk instrument. We do not have the FICO score data for 
the full sample period at our disposal. Previous research (see Cohen-Cole, 2008), however, suggests a very 
strong correlation between average FICO scores and average household income.  
28 The so-called Stock and Watson rule of thumb (Stock and Watson, 2003) is often used as a proxy for the 
strength  of  an  instrument.  According  to  this  rule,  the  first-stage  F-statistic  testing  the  hypothesis  that  the 
coefficients on the instruments are jointly zero should be at least 10. In the case of the deposit rate instruments, 
the F-statistic is 14.5, for the wholesale rate instruments the F-statistic is 13.2, and for the risk instruments the F-
statistic is 12.4. 
29 The inclusion of more comprehensive loan market competition measures and the analysis of their interactions 
with deposit market competition is a planned extension of this research project.   17
generate higher returns than alternative assets) in its portfolio
30. Since the bank can securitize 
and sell the loans after origination, we add the amount of securitized loans to on-balance sheet 
loans. Moreover, as suggested by King (2008), the rate of loan growth might be an important 
determinant of the wholesale rate. Since the loan growth rate can also significantly affect the 
retail deposit rates offered by the banks and the risk of their asset portfolio, we also include 
loan growth as a control variable in all three equations.  
3.4.Estimation technique 
In the estimation of equations (1) and (3), bank-level dependent variables (the risk proxy and 
the rate on wholesale liabilities) are regressed  on bank-market-level explanatory variables 
(e.g.,  deposit  rates).  In  this  case,  the  assumption  of  uncorrelated  error  terms  across  the 
observations may be violated (it is likely that  observations of the same bank in different 
markets will show correlated error terms), resulting in potentially inconsistent estimates. We 
adopt three alternative approaches to deal with our multidimensional panel.  
First, we use the full sample of bank-market observations and cluster the standard errors by 
bank.  Second,  we  alternatively  estimate  the  model  on  the  bank  level  by  computing  the 
average values of the bank-market-level variables (deposit rate, average income, branches-to-
deposits ratio, etc.). For each bank and time period, we compute the average value of each of 
these  variables  across  all  the  local  markets  in  which  the  bank  operates.  Through  the 
aggregation, we achieve consistency of the estimated coefficients but lose information on the 
intensity of the local deposit market and dramatically reduce the number of observations, 
which in turn reduces the efficiency of the estimation. Obviously, this estimation approach 
can only account for the variation across banks. It has, however, the advantage that it accounts 
for the possibility that banks reshuffle deposits across local markets. In this case, the average 
                                                 
30 The intuition behind this proxy of loan market competitiveness follows the intuition suggested by Goyal 
(2005) for using the ratio of demand deposits to total deposits as a proxy of the deposit market power of a bank.   18
intensity of deposit market competition might be the one that matters for bank risk. And third, 
we estimate the model using the subsample of single-market banks (143 out of our sample of 
589  banks  operate  in  only  one  MSA).  Single-market  banks  (SMBs)  face  deposit  market 
competition  in  one  market  only,  and  their  bank-level  risk  is  related  to  the  competitive 
conditions  in  only  this  deposit  market.  The  drawback  of  this  approach  is  that  we  again 
dramatically reduce our sample size.  
In the estimation of the wholesale rate equation we control the potential selection bias, which 
arises from the fact that if banks perceive that they have to pay a disadvantageous rate on their 
wholesale liabilities, they may refrain from borrowing wholesale funds
31. Consequently, for 
such banks we will observe no (or only negligible volumes) of wholesale funding. For these 
reasons we use the censored regression specification suggested by Heckman (1976) when 
estimating  the  wholesale  rate  equation.  Unless  the  share  of  wholesale  liabilities  is  large 
enough, the purchased funds are likely to represent unusual purchases made under extreme 
time  pressure  and  are  thus  unlikely  to  represent  the  price  of  wholesale  funds  as  deposit 
substitutes. Because of this, we did not include an observation in the estimated wholesale 
funds equation unless the volume of federal funds purchased represented at least 1% of the 
bank’s assets.
 32 The Heckman specification creates an auxiliary variable in the first stage, the 
“inverse Mills’ ratio,” which represents the bias caused by the censoring process. As noted by 
Heckman,  instrumental  variable  estimators  are  still  consistent,  once  the  predicted  inverse 
Mills’ ratio is included in the system
33.  
                                                 
31 These selection issues have been explicitly studied by King (2008). 
32 As robustness check we have re-estimated the model using both a fix volume of the federal funds purchased as 
a trigger point (1 million USD, as in King, 2008) and alternative trigger values of the fed funds purchased share 
in total assets (0.05% and 2%). Results do not change qualitatively. 
33 Note that the Mill’s ratio is significant in the estimation of all specifications of the wholesale equation.   19
4.  Estimation results 
In this section we present the results of the baseline model, with the rate on federal funds 
purchased as a wholesale funding rate proxy and the checking account rate as a proxy of the 
intensity of deposit market competition. The results illustrated in Table 3, which contains a 
column for each of the risk measures (negative z-score and the nonperforming loans ratio 
(NPL)), reflect the estimation based on the full sample of bank-market level observations with 
a  quarterly  frequency.  These  results  show  a  statistically  significant  positive  link  between 
deposit rates and bank risk, which is robust to the choice of the risk measure. The estimated 
coefficients suggest a relatively large economic significance of the results. So, a one-standard-
deviation increase of the checking account rate corresponds to a drop in the z-score of slightly 
more than 100 basis points and an increase in the nonperforming loans ratio of 0.003 (equal to 
roughly the average of the nonperforming loans ratio). The rate on federal funds purchased 
enters  the  regression  using  the  z-score  as  a  risk  measure  with  a  statistically  insignificant 
coefficient. Its effect on the nonperforming loans ratio is, however, positive and statistically 
significant: banks paying higher rates on federal fund have on average riskier loan portfolios. 
The magnitude of the estimated coefficient, however, suggests that the economic significance 
of the wholesale rate’s impact is lower than the one of retail deposit rates
34.  
   
                                                 
34 The lower economic and statistical significance of the wholesale rate relative to the retail rate coefficients 
might be due to the fact that our measure of retail rates is less noisy than our wholesale rate measure (imputed 
from the Call Report) and that our retail rate instruments are stronger than the wholesale rate instruments.    20
Table 3: All banks; bank-market level observations; the wholesale rate is measured by the rate 
on fed funds purchased
 
Note: Two-stage least squares IV estimations. Endogenous variables are: bank risk (measured by z-score, NPL, checking 
account rate and the rate on fed funds purchased. The fed funds rate equation is estimated using a Heckman procedure to 







Dependant variable: bank risk
checking account rate 1.590 *** 0.482 0.006 *** 0.003
rate on federal funds purchased -0.057 0.067 0.001 *** 0.001
bank size -3.901 *** 0.783 0.011 *** 0.003
bank size^2 0.129 *** 0.022 0.000 *** 0.000
capitalization -43.593 *** 1.421 -0.021 ** 0.009
loan growth -0.557 *** 0.104 0.000 0.001
loans_ta 0.940 ** 0.380 0.012 *** 0.002
income -0.003 *** 0.001 0.000 0.000
income growth -10.299 *** 2.499 -0.017 *** 0.008
constant 15.676 ** 7.200 -0.101 *** 0.027
Observations 4715 7216
R-squared 0.32 0.09
Dependant variable: checking account rate
bank risk 0.189 *** 0.023 72.405 *** 14.150
rate on federal funds purchased 0.058 *** 0.009 0.081 *** 0.027
bank size -0.360 *** 0.120 -0.426 *** 0.093
bank size^2 0.007 ** 0.003 0.010 *** 0.003
capitalization 8.775 *** 1.281 -3.232 *** 0.623
loan growth 0.152 *** 0.046 0.007 0.064
loans_ta -0.849 *** 0.063 -0.689 *** 0.109
market size 0.000 *** 0.000 0.000 0.000
branch_deposit 4.153 *** 1.028 2.258 *** 0.654
HHI -1.085 *** 0.221 -0.637 *** 0.165
constant 7.134 *** 1.210 4.896 *** 0.829
Observations 4715 7216
R-squared 0.19 0.18
Dependant variable: rate on federal funds purchased
checking account rate 0.997 *** 0.178 1.139 *** 0.185
bank risk 0.019 0.019 25.461 14.993
bank size  0.818 *** 0.109 1.027 *** 0.138
bank size^2 -0.021 *** 0.003 -0.026 *** 0.004
capitalization  -3.025 *** 1.243 -3.365 *** 0.687
loan growth  -0.314 *** 0.085 -0.356 *** 0.081
loans_ta 0.353 *** 0.133 0.654 *** 0.162
effective fed funds rate  0.431 *** 0.019 0.448 *** 0.021
FHLB dummy -0.275 * 0.162 -0.341 * 0.180
BHC dummy 0.047 0.293 0.349 0.294
constant -7.223 *** 1.366 -9.793 *** 1.468
Observations 4715 7612
Censored observations 634 634
R-squared - -
negative Z-score NPL  21
Table 4:  All  banks;  bank  level  observations;  the wholesale  rate  is measured  by  the  rate  on 
federal funds purchased   
 
Note: Two-stage least squares IV estimations. Endogenous variables are: bank risk (measured by z-score, NPL), checking 
account rate and the rate on fed funds purchased. Bank-market level variables are averaged at the bank level. The fed funds 
rate equation is estimated using a Heckman procedure to control for potential selection bias. *, **, *** indicate significance 







Dependant variable: bank risk
checking account rate 2.552 *** 0.597 0.004 0.004
rate on federal funds purchased 0.300 * 0.159 0.000 0.001
bank size 10.729 *** 2.732 0.006 0.004
bank size^2 -0.315 *** 0.084 0.000 0.000
capitalization -55.711 *** 4.081 0.035 0.016
loan growth -0.345 *** 0.142 0.001 0.001
loans_ta 1.435 *** 0.454 0.011 *** 0.003
income -0.002 0.002 0.000 0.000
income growth -8.718 *** 3.490 0.023 0.018
constant -102.354 *** 22.119 -0.055 0.037
Observations 1181 2243
R-squared 0.23 0.06
Dependant variable: checking account rate
bank risk 0.257 * 0.141 -57.333 *** 18.272
rate on federal funds purchased 0.090 0.068 0.371 *** 0.045
bank size -1.244 ** 0.508 -0.569 *** 0.180
bank size^2 0.034 ** 0.015 0.017 *** 0.006
capitalization 21.385 * 11.672 3.668 *** 1.411
loan growth 0.150 0.149 -0.009 0.093
loans_ta -1.282 ** 0.616 0.348 0.263
market size 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
branch_deposit 3.807 3.335 -4.282 *** 1.590
HHI -3.299 * 1.874 0.759 * 0.413
constant 14.926 ** 5.954 4.578 *** 1.441
Observations 1181 2243
R-squared 0.21 0.07
Dependant variable: rate on federal funds purchased
checking account rate 0.937 *** 0.355 0.778 ** 0.373
bank risk 0.021 0.024 -3.087 16.084
bank size  1.029 ** 0.421 1.058 ** 0.423
bank size^2 -0.029 ** 0.012 -0.030 ** 0.012
capitalization  -2.320 2.337 -4.011 *** 1.218
loan growth  -0.172 0.130 -0.182 0.129
loans_ta 0.531 ** 0.216 0.654 *** 0.240
effective fed funds rate  0.403 *** 0.062 0.442 *** 0.071
FHLB dummy -0.038 0.217 -0.023 0.233
BHC dummy -0.190 0.437 -0.119 0.444
constant -8.486 ** 4.021 -9.105 ** 4.008
Observations 4141 4141
Censored observations 345 345
R-squared
negative Z-score NPL  22




Note: Two-stage least squares IV estimations. Endogenous variables are: bank risk (measured by z-score, NPL), checking 
account rate and the rate on fed funds purchased. Only observations of single-market banks The fed funds rate equation is 
estimated using a Heckman procedure to control for potential selection bias. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% 







Dependant variable: bank risk
checking account rate 1.348 * 0.817 0.017 ** 0.010
rate on federal funds purchased -0.202 0.181 0.005 * 0.003
bank size -4.533 8.095 0.025 0.032
bank size^2 0.188 0.283 -0.001 0.001
capitalization -38.766 *** 12.998 0.066 0.060
loan growth -2.433 ** 1.151 0.033 *** 0.009
loans_ta 1.673 * 0.919 0.012 0.009
income -0.001 0.002 0.000 0.000
income growth -9.472 6.396 0.175 ** 0.074
constant 10.681 57.911 -0.242 0.246
Observations 180 323
R-squared 0.13 0.03
Dependant variable: checking account rate
bank risk -0.542 0.661 -55.670 ** 23.661
rate on federal funds purchased 0.004 0.225 0.248 *** 0.047
bank size -31.179 36.267 -4.620 *** 1.399
bank size^2 1.098 1.287 0.160 *** 0.050
capitalization -28.938 39.232 6.945 ** 3.649
loan growth -1.406 2.618 2.162 ** 0.948
loans_ta -0.845 1.020 -1.027 *** 0.261
market size 0.000 0.000 0.000 ** 0.000
branch_deposit -81.461 99.843 -12.373 8.139
HHI 2.004 4.427 4.414 *** 1.916
constant 217.188 250.414 33.452 *** 9.784
Observations 180 323
R-squared 0.07 0.26
Dependant variable: rate on federal funds purchased
checking account rate 0.767 1.008 0.760 1.013
bank risk 0.136 * 0.075 65.472 * 38.445
bank size  0.609 1.019 0.972 1.000
bank size^2 -0.014 0.032 -0.027 0.031
capitalization  8.863 7.360 -7.391 ** 3.225
loan growth  -0.048 0.641 -0.078 0.637
loans_ta -0.170 0.563 -0.245 0.604
effective fed funds rate  0.361 ** 0.175 0.345 * 0.184
FHLB dummy -0.010 0.412 0.480 0.440
BHC dummy -0.643 0.569 -0.592 0.565
constant -3.365 8.814 -7.706 8.509
Observations 704 704
Censored observations 99 99
R-squared - -
negative Z-score NPL  23
Turning to the control variables, the coefficients of the bank size variables suggest humped 
shape of the relation between bank size and bank risk. Moreover, well capitalized banks are 
supposed to pursue less risky strategies. Banks holding more loans on their portfolios are 
significantly riskier, and last but not least, average household income growth corresponds 
with less risky bank portfolios. 
The results of the estimation of the deposit rate equation in this baseline specification also 
confirm the positive link between bank risk and deposit rates. So, for example, banks with a 
high  z-score  are  expected  to  pay  lower  deposit  rates.  Similarly,  banks  with  high  relative 
volumes of nonperforming loans offer higher deposit rates. We also find support for a positive 
relation between the checking account rate and the rate on federal funds purchased. This result 
is consistent with the substitutability of retail and wholesale funding, and it confirms the 
implications of Kiser’s (2003) model.  
And finally, the results of the estimation of the wholesale rate equation support the hypothesis 
that banks which pay high retail deposit rates also pay on average higher wholesale rates 
relative to their peers. That is, within a comprehensive empirical framework, we are able to 
confirm a positive relation between the cost of retail and wholesale funding. Bank risk enters 
these regressions with statistically insignificant coefficients, which suggests that the rates on 
federal funds are not significantly responding to bank risk. This result is consistent with the 
discussion on the shortcomings of market discipline mechanisms in the case of exposures with 
very short (overnight) maturity. 
Next, we re-estimate the model using a sample of observations averaged at the bank level. 
That is, for each bank and quarter we now use only one observation and cannot account for 
the market-level variation. By doing so, we control for the possibility that banks reshuffle 
deposits across local markets. The results of these estimations are presented in Table 4.   24
Qualitatively, these results are very similar to the bank-market-level results presented in Table 
3. However, the reduced number of observations is reflected in the lower efficiency of the 
estimations. Nevertheless, the key result concerning the positive relationship between retail 
deposit  rates  and  bank  risk  is  also  confirmed  (significantly)  in  this  specification.  The 
estimated coefficients suggest a higher magnitude of the effect of deposit rates on the z-score 
(relative to the bank-market-level estimation). The effect of the checking account rates on the 
NPL is estimated to be of no statistical significance.  
And finally, we estimate the model on the sample of banks operating in only one local market 
(see Table 5). In this case, we are again able to qualitatively replicate the results from the 
bank-market-level estimation. The small sample size again results in relatively low efficiency 
of the estimations, but we still do find a positive statistically significant relation between retail 
deposit rates and bank risk. The economic significance of retail rate’s effect on bank risk in 
this case is very high, especially when risk is measured by the nonperforming loans ratio. 
In  sum,  we  find  a  statistically  and  economically  significant  positive  relation  between  the 
intensity of deposit market competition faced by a bank (measured by the retail deposit rate) 
and its risk level. Our empirical results, therefore, support the implications of a series of 
theoretical papers (e.g., Allen and Gale, 2000, Hellmann et al., 2000) that intense deposit 
market competition results in high bank risk.  
5.  Robustness checks 
One potential concern with our sample is the length of the time period, which covers almost a 
decade.  This  decade  was  marked  by  substantial  regulatory  changes,  as  well  as  market 
innovations (such as the liberalization of the narrow banking concept, the liberalization of 
interstate branching, and the use of innovative loan securitization instruments), which might 
have changed the relation between retail and wholesale funding and bank risk. To address   25
these concerns and test the robustness of the results, we split our sample period at the end of 
2000, assuming that by that date the effect of most of these innovations was already present.  
We then re-estimate the model for each of the two subperiods, 1997-2000 and 2001-2006. 
The results are presented in Table 6 and Table 7, respectively. The results for the earlier 
subperiod  are  mixed  and  statistically  insignificant.  The  2001-2006  subsample,  however, 
shows with a very strong economic and statistical significance the positive relation between 
retail deposit rates and bank risk.  
Another potential limitation of our approach is that we proxy the costs of wholesale funding 
by the rate on federal funds purchased. Federal funds are obviously at the shortest end of the 
maturity distribution of wholesale funds. To check the robustness, we re-estimate the model 
using  the  rate  banks  pay  on  subordinated  debt  as  an  alternative  measure  of  the  cost  of 
wholesale liabilities. Because of its longer maturity, subordinated debt can be considered as a 
better substitute for retail deposits than federal funds. Nevertheless, subordinated debt has 
other drawbacks for our research framework, especially if we consider that subordinated debt 
issues  might  not  be  related  to  a  shortage  of  retail  funds  but  rather  to  the  eligibility  of 
subordinated debt as tier-2 capital. We impute the subordinated debt rate in analogy to the rate 
on fed funds purchased by the ratio of “interest on subordinated notes and debentures” (line 
riad4200) and the amount of outstanding “subordinated notes and debentures” (line rcfd3200) 
of the Call Report. Again, when estimating the wholesale rate equation, we account for the 
potential selection issue by estimating a Heckman model with instrumental variables
35. The 
results of the estimation of this model specification are illustrated in Table 8. These results 
show that the positive link between retail rates, wholesale rates, and bank risk is robust to the 
choice of the wholesale rate measure.  
                                                 
35 The results presented in Table 8 are based on the following censoring rule: the subordinated debt is accounted 
for if the share of subordinated debt in total assets is at least 1%. Alternative trigger points (0.5% and 2%) yield 
qualitatively the same results.   26
Table 6: Subperiod 1997-2000; all banks; bank-market level observations; the wholesale rate is 
measured by the rate on federal funds purchased 
 
Note: Two-stage least squares IV estimations. Endogenous variables are: bank risk (measured by z-score, NPL), checking 
account rate and the rate on fed funds purchased. Only observations of single-market banks The fed funds rate equation is 
estimated using a Heckman procedure to control for potential selection bias. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% 







Dependant variable: bank risk
checking account rate -10.357 8.344 0.006 0.005
rate on federal funds purchased 0.566 0.891 0.002 *** 0.000
bank size 3.594 3.275 0.004 0.002
bank size^2 -0.123 0.099 0.000 0.000
capitalization -86.108 *** 16.240 0.035 *** 0.008
loan growth -0.222 0.464 0.000 0.001
loans_ta 4.651 6.713 0.005 0.006
income 0.004 0.006 0.000 0.000
income growth -11.816 16.204 0.038 ** 0.014
constant -28.879 32.054 -0.056 ** 0.024
Observations 529 2291
R-squared 0.04 0.41
Dependant variable: checking account rate
bank risk -0.063 0.070 -22.482 20.838
rate on federal funds purchased 0.059 0.118 0.019 0.060
bank size 0.224 0.450 -0.135 0.222
bank size^2 -0.009 0.014 0.001 0.007
capitalization -4.218 3.956 -1.217 1.249
loan growth -0.006 0.032 0.025 0.029
loans_ta 0.023 0.617 -1.885 *** 0.535
market size 0.000 0.000 0.000 ** 0.000
branch_deposit -0.229 2.471 0.163 1.497
HHI 0.367 0.709 -0.164 0.303
constant -1.379 4.808 3.885 ** 1.775
Observations 529 2291
R-squared 0.02 0.14
Dependant variable: rate on federal funds purchased
checking account rate 1.748 *** 0.526 1.804 *** 0.497
bank risk -8.645 24.189 -31.123 44.782
bank size  1.734 *** 0.401 1.889 *** 0.476
bank size^2 -0.044 *** 0.011 -0.048 *** 0.013
capitalization  -5.027 ** 1.656 -4.427 ** 1.905
loan growth  -0.604 *** 0.159 -0.605 *** 0.154
loans_ta 2.999 *** 0.571 3.248 *** 0.706
effective fed funds rate  0.119 ** 0.067 0.143 **** 0.055
FHLB dummy -0.246 0.190 -0.356 * 0.194
BHC dummy 0.879 * 0.486 1.007 * 0.524
constant -16.851 *** 4.067 -18.507 *** 4.906
Observations 4620 4620
Censored observations 179 179
R-squared - -
negative Z-score NPL  27
Table 7: Subperiod 2001-2006; all banks; bank-market level observations; the wholesale rate is 
measured by the rate on federal funds purchased 
 
Note: Two-stage least squares IV estimations. Endogenous variables are: bank risk (measured by z-score, NPL), checking 
account rate and the rate on fed funds purchased. Only observations of single-market banks The fed funds rate equation is 
estimated using a Heckman procedure to control for potential selection bias. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% 







Dependant variable: bank risk
checking account rate 1.951 *** 0.515 0.011 ** 0.005
rate on federal funds purchased 0.163 ** 0.081 -0.003 0.002
bank size -6.303 *** 0.780 0.001 0.003
bank size^2 0.202 *** 0.022 0.000 0.000
capitalization -41.975 *** 1.621 -0.041 *** 0.011
loan growth -1.463 *** 0.192 0.000 0.001
loans_ta 2.111 *** 0.536 0.018 *** 0.004
income -0.003 *** 0.001 0.000 *** 0.000
income growth -13.413 *** 2.010 -0.063 *** 0.008
constant 34.298 *** 6.920 -0.011 0.022
Observations 4186 4925
R-squared 0.32 0.04
Dependant variable: checking account rate
bank risk 0.119 *** 0.014 12.315 *** 3.613
rate on federal funds purchased 0.107 *** 0.008 0.324 *** 0.016
bank size 0.415 *** 0.124 0.066 0.094
bank size^2 -0.016 *** 0.004 -0.004 0.003
capitalization 3.894 *** 0.728 1.501 *** 0.358
loan growth 0.232 *** 0.045 0.121 *** 0.046
loans_ta -0.955 *** 0.042 -0.876 *** 0.056
market size 0.000 * 0.000 0.000 0.000
branch_deposit 5.379 *** 0.920 0.801 0.705
HHI -0.502 *** 0.178 0.044 0.127
constant -0.079 1.050 0.282 0.807
Observations 4186 4925
R-squared 0.15 0.12
Dependant variable: rate on federal funds purchased
checking account rate 1.067 *** 0.138 1.033 *** 0.142
bank risk 0.034 ** 0.015 24.093 ** 11.258
bank size  0.118 0.083 0.042 0.104
bank size^2 -0.001 0.002 0.001 0.003
capitalization  -0.646 0.957 -3.375 *** 0.529
loan growth  -0.242 *** 0.083 -0.280 *** 0.080
loans_ta 1.197 *** 0.100 1.150 *** 0.118
effective fed funds rate  0.261 *** 0.016 0.253 *** 0.018
FHLB dummy -0.157 0.106 -0.024 0.119
BHC dummy 0.346 0.806 0.279 0.810
constant -1.896 1.322 -1.676 1.400
Observations 9222 9222
Censored observations 455 455
R-squared - -
negative Z-score NPL  28
Table 8: All banks; bank-market level observations; the wholesale rate is measured by the 
subordinated debt rate 
 
 
Note: Two-stage least squares IV estimations. Endogenous variables are: bank risk (measured by z-score, NPL), 
checking account rate and the subordinated debt rate. The sub debt rate equation is estimated using a Heckman 









Dependant variable: bank risk
checking account rate 0.126 1.021 0.005 *** 0.002
rate on subordinated debt 0.180 0.138 0.002 *** 0.001
bank size -17.055 *** 1.486 0.002 0.003
bank size^2 0.473 *** 0.045 0.000 0.000
capitalization -50.817 *** 2.622 0.011 0.009
loan growth -1.256 *** 0.239 0.000 0.001
loans_ta -0.328 1.090 0.011 *** 0.001
income -0.003 *** 0.001 0.000 0.000
income growth -16.917 *** 5.379 -0.014 *** 0.004
constant 142.024 *** 12.220 -0.034 0.028
Observations 3733 5715
R-squared 0.33 0.38
Dependant variable: checking account rate
bank risk 0.144 *** 0.018 -3.730 16.393
rate on subordinated debt 0.051 *** 0.009 0.515 *** 0.119
bank size 0.836 *** 0.153 -1.295 *** 0.433
bank size^2 -0.025 *** 0.004 0.038 *** 0.013
capitalization 5.535 *** 0.990 4.992 *** 1.707
loan growth 0.276 *** 0.059 -0.036 0.138
loans_ta -0.847 *** 0.042 -0.356 0.229
market size 0.000 ** 0.000 0.000 0.000
branch_deposit 4.347 *** 1.188 -6.372 ** 2.927
HHI -0.375 ** 0.171 -0.166 0.375
constant -4.542 *** 1.354 9.850 *** 3.453
Observations 3733 5715
R-squared 0.16 0.2
Dependant variable: rate on subordinated debt
checking account rate 2.892 *** 0.506 2.916 *** 0.637
bank risk 0.092 ** 0.045 126.876 *** 48.241
bank size  4.872 *** 0.932 5.529 *** 1.184
bank size^2 -0.119 *** 0.023 -0.133 *** 0.029
capitalization  -6.763 ** 2.892 -16.810 *** 2.270
loan growth  -1.471 *** 0.267 -1.767 *** 0.339
loans_ta 0.881 ** 0.355 0.483 0.495
effective fed funds rate  0.047 0.048 -0.016 0.066
FHLB dummy -2.767 *** 0.532 -2.105 *** 0.724
BHC dummy -0.392 *** 0.103 -0.428 ** 0.213
constant -44.055 *** 9.575 -53.235 *** 12.282
Observations 13842 13842
Censored observations 5153 5153
R-squared - -
negative Z-score NPL  29




Note: Two-stage least squares IV estimations. Endogenous variables are: bank risk (measured by z-score, NPL), 
and checking account rate.  Bank-market level  variables  are averaged at the bank  level.  *,  **,  *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
The statistical and economic significance of the wholesale rate and risk relation is in the case 
of subordinated debt rate even stronger than in the federal funds purchased rate
36, showing 
that the maturity of wholesale exposures is an important determinant of the relation between 
bank risk and the costs of wholesale funding.  
And finally, in order to present results directly comparable to those of earlier studies that 
ignore  wholesale  funding,  we  re-estimate  the  model  ignoring  the  impact  of  the  costs  of 
wholesale funding. In this case, we estimate only equation (1) and equation (2). The idea of 
this robustness check is to address the potential critique that the limitations of our measures of 
                                                 







Dependant variable: bank risk
checking account rate 1.085 *** 0.201 0.008 *** 0.001
bank size -4.229 *** 0.739 0.009 *** 0.001
bank size^2 0.136 *** 0.021 0.000 *** 0.000
capitalization -44.434 *** 1.268 -0.004 0.006
loan growth -0.557 *** 0.103 0.000 0.001
loans_ta 0.561 ** 0.248 0.012 *** 0.001
income -0.003 *** 0.001 0.000 0.000
income growth -12.262 *** 1.117 -0.005 0.005
constant 19.685 *** 6.512 -0.085 *** 0.013
Observations 4715 7216
R-squared 0.31 0.02
Dependant variable: checking account rate
bank risk 0.172 *** 0.018 118.582 *** 11.189
bank size -0.052 0.194 -0.963 *** 0.177
bank size^2 -0.004 0.006 0.026 *** 0.005
capitalization 5.779 *** 0.864 -0.682 0.719
loan growth 0.095 *** 0.028 -0.038 0.082
loans_ta -0.968 *** 0.034 -1.341 *** 0.081
market size 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
branch_deposit 6.751 *** 1.096 2.336 * 1.274
HHI -0.405 ** 0.189 -0.088 0.256
constant 5.336 *** 1.550 9.309 *** 1.452
Observations 4715 7216
R-squared 0.18 0.26
negative Z-score NPL  30
the costs of wholesale funding bias our results. The results of this model specification are 
presented in Table 9. They again show a very strong positive, economically and statistically 
significant relation between the retail deposit rates offered by a bank and its risk. That is, 
banks that have less deposit market power and thus offer higher deposit rates are riskier.  
6.  Conclusion 
Despite the intense political and academic interest into the issue of the potential risk effects of 
bank competition, the literature has not yet reached a consensus on whether bank competition 
indeed has a positive effect on bank risk. In this paper we revisit the debate by estimating a 
system of equations which describe the relation between deposit market competition, the costs 
of wholesale funding, and bank risk. Although wholesale funding affects both the risk of a 
bank and its behavior in the deposit market, the wholesale market for funds has so far been 
ignored in the competition and risk literature. The main contribution of this study is, therefore, 
the integration of the market for wholesale bank funding into the analysis of the competition 
and risk nexus. 
The results of our empirical estimation show a robust positive link between the intensity of 
deposit market competition faced by a bank and the risk of the bank. We interpret these 
results as evidence for the risk-increasing effects of deposit market competition and suggest 
that  banks  with  less  deposit  market  power  are  more  likely  to  choose  riskier  strategies. 
However, our results reflect only potential costs of bank competition. The examination of the 
trade-off between the efficiency gains of a competitive versus oligopolistic banking sector and 
the higher risk of banks operating in competitive environment go beyond the scope of this 
study. This trade-off,  which is essential for the formulation of regulatory policies, is still 
underexplored in the empirical banking literature and should be subject to further research.   
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